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We re-consider the impact that regulation of call termination on mobile phones has had on mobile
customers’ bills. Using a large panel covering 27 countries, we find that the ‘waterbed’ phenomenon,
initially observed until early 2006, becomes insignificant on average over the 10-year period, 2002–11.
We argue that this is related to the changing nature of the industry, whereby mobile-to-mobile traffic
now plays a much bigger role compared to fixed-to-mobile calls in earlier periods. Over the same
decade, we find no evidence that regulation caused a reduction in mobile operators’ profits and
investments.
Mobile (or cellular) communications markets have been growing at an impressive
rate over the last two decades, with worldwide subscriptions increasing from a few
million in the 1990s to seven billion users in 2013 on all continents.1 Competition in
the industry has been quite vigorous and regulators have not interfered much with
the workings of the market. In particular, and contrary to fixed telephony networks,
retail prices directly set by regulators are virtually unknown in mobile telephony.
This view is possibly too simplistic, as regulators have also dealt extensively with
matters related to mobile telephony but in a way which is less visible to end users. An
important question is whether the design of regulation of the early days is still valid in
the light of the dynamic development of this industry.2
Regulators in particular worry about inter-network (termination) charges for calls to
mobile networks and, starting in the early 2000s, have repeatedly intervened over the
years to cut these charges with the aim to improve competition and reduce prices to
final consumers. However, both academics and mobile operators have argued that
reducing the level of mobile termination rates (MTRs) can potentially increase, instead
of decrease, the level of prices for mobile subscribers, causing what it was termed as the
‘waterbed’ effect. In our earlier work (Genakos and Valletti, 2011), using data for the
* Corresponding author: Tommaso Valletti, Imperial College London, South Kensington Campus,
London SW7 2AZ, UK. Email: t.valletti@imperial.ac.uk.
We thank the editor, two anonymous referees, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig and seminar audiences in
Florence, London (Imperial and Ofcom) and Paris for helpful comments and discussions. Genakos is
grateful for funding received by the European Union (European Social Fund) and Greek National Funds
through the operational programme ‘Education and Lifelong Learning’ of the National Strategic Reference
Framework – Research Funding Program: Thalis – AUEB – New Methods in the Analysis of Market
Competition: Oligopoly, Networks and Regulation. The opinions expressed in this article and all remaining
errors are those of the authors alone.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1 World Telecommunication/ICT Indicator Database, International Telecommunications Union, 2013.
2 An issue that we do not consider here are barriers to entry, which are mainly due to a limited number of
licenses granted by national authorities, reflecting a scarcity in the spectrum of electromagnetic frequencies
that are needed to operate a mobile telephony network. This physical restriction has been overcome to some
extent in recent years due to the creation of ‘mobile virtual network operators’ (MVNOs), which are
independent firms that do not own a physical network but rather rent airtime on existing ones.
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period 2002–6, we showed that, indeed, countries that introduced regulation that cut
the termination rates caused a significant waterbed effect, whereby a 10% reduction in
MTRs led to a 5% increase in mobile retail prices, varying between 2% and 15%
depending on the estimate. In other words, cuts in termination rates before 2006 had
led to the possibly adverse consequence of increasing the yearly bill per mobile
subscriber by roughly 25 euro (varying from 10 to 82 euro), or some 750 million euro
(varying from 300 to 2,400 million) extra in total in our sample.
The introduction of the New Regulatory Framework for electronic communications
by the European Commission in 2002, where mobile termination was defined as a
relevant market, meant that over time all EU countries imposed various differential cuts
to termination rates. The debate among regulators and mobile operators on the likely
benefits and costs of termination rate regulation became even more intense, with our
work being featured as a ‘weapon’ against any tightening of such regulation.3 At the
same time though, the telecommunications market was undergoing a fundamental
change, whereby mobile voice traffic had overcome fixed line call volumes, changing
the economic forces that gave rise to the waterbed effect in the previous years.
In this article, we summarise these new theoretical arguments related to the
underlying changes in mobile-to-mobile (M2M) and fixed-to-mobile (F2M) traffic
volume; we empirically revisit our earlier analysis, using an extended data set covering
27 countries from 2002 until the end of 2011. Our new results demonstrate that the
waterbed effect is not present anymore on average across the whole sample. Delving
deeper into the possible channels, we uncover, in line with theory, that the
distinguishing feature for this change is the importance of calls made from and to
mobile phones relative to calls made to mobile phones from fixed lines. The ratio of
mobile to fixed traffic is key in our findings. Countries that introduced termination
rate regulation when mobile traffic was high did not experience any waterbed effect.
On the contrary, countries that introduced the same regulation at a time of low mobile
traffic experienced the waterbed effect overall: retail prices first increased substantially,
as we found in Genakos and Valletti (2011), but then this effect considerably decreased
over time due to the growing importance of M2M traffic. Finally, we do not find any
evidence that profits of mobile operators have been affected by regulatory cuts in
termination rates.
Our results have important policy consequences. The fact that mobile penetration
nowadays is very high in most developed countries and that M2M traffic far exceeds
F2M traffic volumes, means that regulators should now be less worried about possible
adverse or unintended short-run consequences of regulatory cuts to mobile termina-
tion charges. The absence of the waterbed effect now implies that further termination
charges cuts will decrease the price of calls to mobile phones, which will benefit
consumers. Nor there is any strong indication that these cuts have considerably
3 When responding to the European Commission’s 2008 Recommendation on further cuts to MTRs,
Vodafone, the largest mobile operator in Europe, explicitly mentioned our work on the waterbed effect
(available, at the time, in a draft form) and went as far as to argue that such further cuts would result in a
decrease in mobile ownership within the EU-27 by almost 40 million users. See http://ec.europa.eu/
information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/termination_rates/library/public_consult/termination_rates/vo-
dafone.pdf.
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weakened the mobile operators’ position to survive or to compete by making new
investments.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In Section 1, we describe the main
issues related to mobile interconnection. In particular, we highlight how results from
the extant literature differ when calls are made from fixed to mobile networks, as
opposed to calls within the mobile industry. Section 2 presents the empirical
framework, while Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 discusses the empirical
results, split between the effects that regulation had on customers’ bills and on mobile
operators’ profits. Section 5 concludes.
1. Interconnection and Call Termination
Telecommunications networks sell wholesale services (also called ‘termination’) to
each other, as a call which is initiated on a network must obviously also be answered,
and not necessarily on the same network. These termination services are not directly
visible to end users but have an impact on their bills.
In the early days of mobile telephony, the largest amount of traffic directed to
mobile phones would come from fixed networks. The economics literature highlighted
how, even in settings where mobile operators compete against each other vigorously,
competition does not help to keep F2M termination rates low (Gans and King, 2000;
Armstrong, 2002; Wright, 2002). This situation has been called one of ‘competitive
bottlenecks’: mobile operators have the ability and incentives to set monopoly prices in
the market for F2M calls (as the price there is paid by callers on the fixed line, not by
own mobile customers) but the rents thus obtained might be exhausted via cheaper
prices to mobile customers in case competition among mobile operators is vigorous.
The intuition for the monopoly pricing result for the F2M market is simple: imagine
F2M termination rates were set at cost; then one mobile operator, by raising its F2M
termination rate, would be able to generate additional profits that it could use to lower
subscription charges and attract more customers. While the mobile sector would
therefore not necessarily be making any excess profits overall, an inefficiently low
number of F2M calls would be made.
Given the strong case for regulatory intervention, it is not surprising that many
countries have decided to intervene to cut these rates. Indeed, all EU member states, as
well as several other countries, have done so, to the benefit of consumers calling
mobile phones. The ‘market analysis’ performed under the European Regulatory
Framework for Communications adheres to this logic: each mobile network is a
monopolist on termination of calls to its own customers and therefore has the market
power to raise wholesale prices significantly above cost.
By cutting termination rates, regulators have benefited those fixed users calling
mobile phones from the fixed networks. However, reducing the level of F2M
termination rates can potentially increase the level of prices for mobile subscribers,
causing what is known as the ‘waterbed’ (or ‘seesaw’) effect. The negative relationship
between F2M termination rates and prices paid by mobile consumers is a rather strong
theoretical prediction that holds under many assumptions about the details of
competition among mobile operators (Armstrong, 2002; Wright, 2002; Genakos and
Valletti, 2011).
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These predictions, though, are only valid for F2M calls. Over the last decade, most
countries have witnessed a strong growth of the mobile sector that has now overtaken
fixed telephony. Given these developments, it is worth asking if the economics of M2M
calls are the same and whether the rationale for intervention has changed or not.
The economics literature has analysed those issues in detail. To make the analysis
sharper, a large part of the literature on competition between mobile networks is
concerned primarily with their interconnection and the setting of the corresponding
wholesale prices, therefore ignoring calls received from the fixed network, which were
instead the focus of the earlier studies. The seminal works of Armstrong (1998) and
Laffont et al. (1998) considered the question of whether mobile networks could
achieve collusive outcomes in the retail market by jointly choosing the M2M
termination rate. This research question should be seen in the light of the broader
issue of whether competition between firms owning communications infrastructures
should involve only minimal regulation, such as an obligation to give access and
negotiate over the respective charges, or whether wholesale prices should be regulated
directly. A concern is that wholesale rates might be set in such a way as to relax
competition in the retail market, i.e. that termination rates could be used as an
instrument of ‘tacit’ collusion.
What the more recent literature found is that the answer depends on several
nuances of the models employed. A reduction in M2M termination causes directly a
reduction in the costs for all calls made to customers belonging to a different mobile
network (the so-called ‘off-net’ calls). But there are also subtle strategic effects, often
depending on the types of tariffs used: with linear tariffs, i.e. tariffs that only charge for
each call made, networks would co-ordinate on termination rates above cost in order to
raise the cost of stealing each other’s clients. In this case, lowering M2M termination
rates would actually make the industry more competitive, therefore reducing bills. In
this scenario, one would expect a positive relationship between termination rates and
customers’ bills. This is in stark contrast with the unambiguous waterbed effect that
would arise from F2M calls.
Hence, the economics of F2M termination are quite different from the economics of
M2M termination. But, in practice, the two are related. A relation arises in two ways:
either both M2M and F2M termination rates are forced by regulation to be set at the
same level, or ‘arbitrage’ possibilities force them to be so, as discussed in Armstrong
and Wright (2009).
This has important consequences for the way customers’ bills would change as a
consequence of regulations that cuts termination rates. In Appendix A, we present a
simple Hotelling model of duopoly competition in the mobile industry, alongside calls
being received from the fixed network and show that the total bill of a mobile customer
can be summarised as follows:
Bill ¼ cost þHotelling parameter ‘rent from F2M calls’
þ ‘effect of M2M competition’: (1)
The first term on the RHS refers to the total cost of supplying mobile telephony
services to a user. The second term is a standard term reflecting the intensity of
(horizontal) competition between networks. The third and fourth terms are what we
discussed above; both depend on termination rates. The lower the termination rate,
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the lower the termination rent from F2M calls, therefore causing a waterbed effect: the
bill should increase as a consequence of a regulatory cut in termination rates. However,
this very same cut will also impact on the last term. While in general its sign depends on
model details, it suffices here to say that there are plausible circumstances that make
the last effect opposite to the waterbed prediction. An example was given above
(competition in linear tariffs) but there are several other mechanisms that generate
the same predictions.4 Since regulation affects both the last two terms, our aim is to try
to capture the overall effect on the total bill coming from regulatory cuts in MTRs.
2. Empirical Framework
For our empirical analysis, we employ an instrumental variable regression framework,
similar to our earlier research (Genakos and Valletti, 2011):
ln Pujct ¼ aujc þ at þ b1 lnðMTRÞjct þ eujct ; (2)
ln Pjct ¼ ajc þ at þ b1 lnðMTRÞjct þ ejct : (3)
Equation (2) tests the impact of regulation of MTRs on customers’ bills, while (3)
tests the impact regulation has on mobile operators’ profits. In more detail, the
dependent variable in (2) is the logarithm of (euro PPP adjusted) retail prices (ln Pujct)
paid by a customer with the usage profile u = {low, medium, high} and subscribing to
mobile operator j in country c in quarter t. The dependent variable in (3) is the
logarithm of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA),
which is defined as the sum of operating income and depreciation and is our proxy for
profits (ln Πjct). Time fixed effects (at) and usage-operator-country fixed effects (aujc)
control for time-invariant global trends and for usage-operator-country characteristics
respectively. The main variable of interest, ln(MTR)jct, is the logarithm of the (euro
PPP adjusted) MTRs charged by mobile operators for terminating calls on their
networks.
The key idea is to use termination rate regulation as an instrument that directly
impacts only on MTRs and not customers’ bills. In our earlier work (Genakos and
Valletti, 2011, pp. 10–14) we argue extensively on the exogeneity of regulation with
respect to mobile bills. We recall here the important point that regulators do not have
any legal power to intervene on retail prices in the mobile industry and conduct a
wholesale market analysis of mobile call termination only. Hence, both retail prices
and termination rates were freely chosen by mobile operators before the introduction
of regulation and should be considered endogenous. After the introduction of
regulation though, MTRs were capped by regulators through glide paths that were
always binding for mobile operators. In other words, after regulation is applied, the
MTR becomes exogenous as it is set by the regulators and not the mobile operators
themselves.
4 An expression akin to (1) can be found, e.g. in the model of Armstrong and Wright (2009) that we take
as a reference point (see their equation (12)). Other models that would generate a similar prediction on bills
include those of Hoernig et al. (2014) who model calling circles, Hurkens and Lopez (2014) who consider
customers’ expectations, and Jullien et al. (2013), who deal with heterogeneous mobile calling patterns. For
surveys on the existing literature, see Armstrong (2002), Gans et al. (2005) and Hoernig and Valletti (2012).
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As an example, consider the MTRs set by the telecommunications regulator in
France (ARCEP; http://www.arcep.fr/index.php?id=8080). Regulation was introduced
in 2004, when mobile termination to the two largest firms (Orange and SFR) was
capped at 14.94 €cent/min, while the latest entrant in the market (Bouygues) was
capped at 17.89 €cent/min. All operators indeed set their termination rates at the
maximum level allowed by the cap. In every year since then, the regulator has further
cut MTRs, allowing some differentiation between the largest incumbents and the
smallest entrant, until 2011Q3 when all operators’ MTRs were capped at the same rate
of 2 €cent/min. This is a huge change in just seven years, showing an example of how
the binding glide paths set by the regulators have been decreasing fast over time. We
exploit both differences in the timing of the enactment and also differences in the
toughness of the implementation of the regulation across and within countries.5 First,
we use a binary indicator (0/1) to signify the exact timing of the start of regulation for
every operator in each country (Regulationjct). The impact of regulation on prices
through the MTR is identified from countries that introduced the regulation and
measures the effect of regulation in reforming countries compared to the general
evolution of prices in non-reforming countries. This simple indicator is very powerful
when examining the years around the change in regulation. However, its identification
power deteriorates towards the end of our data set when all the countries have
introduced such regulation. For instance, in the French case illustrated above, a binary
variable equal to one over the seven-year period 2004–11 would not be able to capture
the actual toughness of regulation at the intensive margin. Using the binary indicator
is not enough because prices do not simply respond to the initial step decrease in
MTRs but also to a continuous and fast sliding path. To capture this underlying
phenomenon, we also employ an index of regulation that varies over time depending
not only when each country introduced this regulation but also how ‘tough’ the
regulatory authorities were in cutting MTRs. Our index of regulation is defined as:
MaxCountryMTR indexjct ¼
0 if MTRjct is unregulated,
MaxMTRc MTRjct
MTRjct
if MTRjct is regulated,
8><
>:
(4)
where MaxMTRc is the highest MTR allowed in country c one quarter before the
introduction of regulation, capturing the level that MTRs would achieve in the absence
of regulatory interventions. The absolute level of the index is not of particular concern
when comparing countries, as we control for time-invariant country-operator-usage
fixed effects, as well as time fixed effects that account for common global trends.
3. Data
We matched three different data sources for our analysis. First, we used Cullen
International to get information on MTRs. Using this source and various other
5 On the rationale as to why regulation varies across operators within a country, see Dewenter and Haucap
(2005).
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industry and regulatory publications, we were also in a position to identify the dates
in which regulation was introduced across countries and operators, and the level of
regulated rates (see, Table 1). Second, we used Teligen to obtain quarterly
information on the total bills paid by consumers across operators and countries
(2002Q3–2011Q4). Teligen collects and compares all available tariffs of the two
largest mobile operators for thirty OECD countries. It constructs three different
consumer usage profiles (large, medium and low) based on the number of calls and
messages, the average call length and the time and type of call.6 A distinction
between pre-paid (pay-as-you-go) and post-paid (contract) tariffs is also accounted
for, as this is an important industry characteristic. These consumer profiles are then
held fixed when looking across countries and time. Third, we used quarterly
information taken from the Global Wireless Matrix of the Bank of America Merrill
Lynch data set (henceforth, BoAML). BoAML compiles basic operating metrics for
mobile operators in 46 countries. For our purposes, we used the reported earnings
Table 1
Regulation Chronology
Country Year Comment
Poland 1997Q1 Always regulated
UK 1998Q1 Always regulated
Belgium 1999Q2 Always regulated
Austria 2000Q2 Always regulated
Italy 2000Q2 Always regulated
Japan 2000Q2 Always regulated
Spain 2000Q2 Always regulated
Finland 2001Q2 Always regulated
Norway 2001Q2 Always regulated
Sweden 2001Q2 Always regulated
Denmark 2001Q4 Always regulated
Hungary 2002Q1 Always regulated
Portugal 2003Q4 Old treatment group
France 2004Q2 Old treatment group
Estonia 2005Q2 Always regulated
Slovenia 2005Q2 Always regulated
Australia 2005Q2 Old treatment group
Czech Republic 2005Q2 Always regulated
Germany 2005Q2 Old treatment group
Slovak Republic 2005Q2 Always regulated
Switzerland 2005Q4 Old treatment group
Ireland 2006Q2 New treatment group
Luxembourg 2006Q2 New treatment group
New Zealand 2006Q2 New treatment group
Turkey 2006Q2 New treatment group
The Netherlands 2006Q3 New treatment group
Greece 2006Q4 New treatment group
Notes. The Table presents information on when the termination rate regulation was introduced in a country
(column ‘Year’), and the way these countries were treated within our sample period using the Teligen price
data (column ‘Comment’).
Source. Authors’ calculations based on information from Cullen International, the European Commission
and Regulatory Authorities by Country.
6 Note that these are hypothetical profiles and not actual customer bills.
© 2015 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
2015] A D E C A D E O F M T R R E GU L A T I O N F37
margin before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA).7 Table 2
provides some key summary statistics.
The Teligen data set has two main advantages. First, by fixing a priori the calling
profiles of customers, it provides us with information on the best choices of these
customers across countries and time. Second, the prices reported in this data set
include much of the relevant information for this industry, such as inclusive
minutes, quantity discounts, discounts to special numbers, etc. (although it does not
include handset subsidies). However, this richness of information comes at the cost
of having data for only the two biggest operators of every country at each point in
time. This reduces the variability and makes identification of our variables of interest
harder.8 Moreover, examining a decade long of consumer behaviour in such a
dynamic industry such as the telecommunication industry, would perhaps call into
question the stability of the customer profiles throughout the whole period. Indeed,
Table 2
Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max
Teligen data set
ln Pujct 5,283 5.711 0.741 3.480 7.509
ln(MTR)jct 5,283 2.270 0.518 0.694 3.292
Regulationjct 5,283 0.867 0.340 0 1
MaxCountryMTR indexjct 5,283 0.436 1.131 0 8.780
Always regulated countries
ln Pujct 2,922 5.652 0.770 3.480 7.391
ln(MTR)jct 2,922 2.238 0.546 0.698 3.243
Old treatment countries
ln Pujct 1,086 5.831 0.675 4.119 7.197
ln(MTR)jct 1,086 2.279 0.524 0.694 3.292
Regulationjct 1,086 0.782 0.413 0 1
MaxCountryMTR indexjct 1,086 1.276 1.561 0 8.780
New treatment countries
ln Pujct 1,275 5.743 0.714 3.863 7.509
ln(MTR)jct 1,275 2.337 0.432 0.993 3.199
Regulationjct 1,275 0.635 0.482 0 1
MaxCountryMTR indexjct 1,275 0.719 1.452 0 7.710
Bank of America Merrill Lynch data set
ln EBITDAjct 2,260 1.161 0.448 4.749 0.536
ln(MTR)jct 2,260 2.273 0.529 0.693 3.454
Regulationjct 2,260 0.847 0.360 0 1
MaxCountryMTR indexjct 2,260 0.475 1.138 0 8.780
Notes. TheTableprovides summary statistics on thekey variablesused inTables 3–4andB2 (onlineAppendixB)
based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every quarter, the BoAML data set and
the matched MTRs.
Source. Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen, Cullen and BoAML matched data sets.
7 All consumer prices, termination rates and revenue data were converted to euros using the purchasing
power parities (PPP) currency conversions published by the OECD to ease comparability. None of our results
depends on this transformation.
8 The BoAML data set, which gathers information from companies’ accounts, includes instead every
mobile operator in a country.
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Teligen adjusted the calling profiles of its customers in 2006 and we also use this
data set to examine the robustness of our results.
4. Results
Results from our baseline model (2) are reported in Table 3. In column (1) we
replicate our earlier results: for the period 2002Q3–2006Q1, we found a statistically
significant waterbed effect when employing the binary indicator for regulation
(Genakos and Valletti, 2011, Table 1, column 1). Column (2) applies the same
approach to the whole sample (2002Q3–2011Q4). The picture now changes quite
dramatically, despite a trebling of the sample size. The waterbed effect is now
statistically indistinguishable from zero. Most importantly though, the binary indicator
of regulation does not seem to be a valid instrument in the first stage. This is somehow
expected since, as argued above, the identification power of the binary indicator
diminishes over time as all the countries become regulated and underestimates the
tightening of regulatory cuts over time. For this reason, in the next two columns, we
employ the MaxCountry index of regulation. In column (3), looking at the period
2002–6, there is a positive and significant waterbed effect, in line with our earlier
Table 3
Waterbed Effect Through MTR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dependent variable ln Pujct ln Pujct ln Pujct ln Pujct
Time period 2002–6 2002–11 2002–6 2002–11
ln(MTR)jct 1.189*** 2.663 0.760*** 0.083
(0.408) (4.465) (0.209) (0.112)
Pre-paidjct 0.066 0.052 0.056** 0.094***
(0.050) (0.077) (0.026) (0.022)
Usage-country-operator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument Regulationjct Regulationjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
1st stage coefficient 0.112*** 0.022 0.329*** 0.138***
(0.026) (0.039) (0.025) (0.009)
1st stage R2 0.052 0.001 0.168 0.267
1st stage F-test 18.28 0.32 179.19 235.59
[0.000] [0.575] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1,749 5,283 1,749 5,283
Clusters 153 195 153 195
Notes. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with
different usage at every quarter. The instrumental variable Regulation is a binary indicator that takes the value
one in the quarters when mobile termination rates are regulated. The instrumental variableMaxCountryMTR
is an index that takes larger values, the more regulated a mobile operator is compared to the MTR prior to
regulation in that country. p-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the
country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below co-efficients: *significant at 10%; **significant
at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source. Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every
quarter.
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results, thus reassuring on the validity of the MaxCountry index of regulation. The
effect becomes insignificant when looking at the whole sample in column (4). Notice
that the first-stage co-efficient is in both cases negative and significant, capturing the
continuous tightening of the regulation. We conclude that a decade of regulation has
cut termination rates, but did not have any adverse impact on mobile bills to final
customers on the whole.9
In Table 4 we conduct several robustness checks.10 First, Teligen updated in 2006
the way it calculates baskets of services. In particular, from 2006Q2, Teligen reports
Table 4
Waterbed Effect Through MTR – Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV IV
Dependent variable ln Pujct ln Pujct ln Pujct ln Pujct ln Pujct
Time period 2006–11
Old basket
2006–11
New basket
2002–11
Excluding Estonia,
Finland and Slovenia
2002–11
New
treatment
group
2002–11
Old
treatment
group
ln(MTR)jct 0.005 0.079 0.087 0.096 0.319***
(0.116) (0.135) (0.113) (0.181) (0.105)
Pre-paidjct 0.097*** 0.053** 0.093*** 0.083*** 0.079***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
Usage-country-
operator FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
1st stage coefficient 0.129*** 0.072*** 0.139*** 0.134*** 0.118***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
1st stage R2 0.293 0.038 0.272 0.174 0.162
1st stage F-test 190.58 9.77 225.5 196.45 126.5
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007]
Observations 3,534 3,534 5,085 4,197 4,008
Clusters 186 186 177 159 153
Notes. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the euros PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with
different usage at every quarter. The instrumental variable Regulation is a binary indicator that takes the value
one in the quarters when mobile termination rates are regulated. The instrumental variableMaxCountryMTR
is an index that takes larger values, the more regulated a mobile operator is compared to the MTR prior to
regulation in that country. p-values for diagnostic tests are in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the
country-operator-usage level are reported in parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant
at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source. Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every
quarter.
9 Also notice that the Pre-paid dummy always gets a negative sign, statistically significant in columns (3) and
(4), reflecting that pre-paid bills are lower than post-paid bills.
10 We also considered an alternative index of regulation instead of the MaxCountry index. We constructed
an index called MaxAll, similar to (4), but where we replace the MaxMTRc in the numerator of the RHS with
the highest MTR among all countries at a given period t. This index has more time variation. Results are
reported in Table B1 and remain qualitatively the same (see online Appendix B).
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information both about a ‘new’ basket that it found more relevant for market
comparisons, as well as the ‘old’ basket employed in earlier periods. Hence, in the
second half of our data (2006Q2–2011Q4), we can see if differences might arise by
employing different weights in the customers’ profiles. The answer is no: results persist
in both cases; see columns (1) and (2). Employing both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Teligen
baskets produces very comparable results, whereby the first stage coefficient is negative
and significant but the second stage impact on MTRs is statistically not different from
zero.
Second, in the expanded data set, new countries not previously monitored are
included. These correspond to Estonia, Finland and Slovenia (about 200 observations
in total). To check if results are driven by a composition effect, we exclude these
countries. Results in column (3) are virtually identical to those in Table 3, column (4).
Hence, the vanishing of the waterbed effect does not seem to be driven by having
included a particular set of countries.
As a third exercise, we consider the extent to which results are driven by the
treatment group. In Genakos and Valletti (2011), we had a set of countries that were
always regulated, a set that were always unregulated and a set of countries that
experienced a change of regulation during the period. The latter set of countries is the
treatment group in our earlier work.11 In the new data set, all countries get regulated –
sooner or later. In column (4), we compare the set of countries that got regulated post-
2006 (‘new treatment group’)12 with the control group that was always regulated
throughout the period – hence excluding the treatment group of Genakos and Valletti
(2011). Results indicate that the waterbed effect is not present for this set of countries.
Finally, in column (5), we compare the evolution of prices in countries that introduced
the MTR regulation before 2006 (‘old treatment group’) to the evolution of prices in
countries that were regulated, hence excluding the countries that were unregulated
until 2006. Results seem to indicate that the waterbed effect is still present for this set
of countries, even though it has been reduced significantly over time.13 Hence, there
seems to be a distinctive behaviour between countries that introduce termination rate
regulation earlier to the countries that did that later on. In line with the theoretical
arguments presented above, our conjecture is that this difference is not random, but
stems from the increasing importance of M2M relative to F2M calls. We explore this
hypothesis below.
4.1. Industry Evolution
The picture in the telephony market that emerges in recent years is very different from
the one in earlier years, where we had found in our previous work the existence of a
waterbed effect. The evolution of the UK market provides an interesting case study.
According to Ofcom, the UK’s regulator, in 2005 the volume of F2M calls was
15.7 billion minutes, comparable with 16 billion minutes of M2M off-net calls. By 2012,
F2M calls were 9.4 billion minutes, less than one quarter of the 43 billion minutes of
11 The set comprises Australia, France, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland.
12 The set comprises Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Turkey.
13 The second stage co-efficient in Table 4, column (5) is less than half that of Table 3, column (3).
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M2M off-net calls (‘Communications Market Report: UK’, Ofcom 2013). From these
figures, it is also immediately apparent how relevant the stakes are: a cut in termination
rates of 1 penny per minute, when multiplied by several billions of minutes of
communications every year, produces large transfers of money in the industry.
Therefore, according to the theoretical predictions summarised by (1), what should
matter for the overall effect of regulation of termination rates on mobile customers’
bills, is the relative weight that F2M calls have compared to M2M calls. The larger the
share of M2M calls, the lower the waterbed effect that could even change sign.
To investigate this, we collected additional information on traffic patterns in the
telephony industry to see how these changed over time. First, we collected annual
information on the ratio of mobile to total outgoing voice traffic14 from the Body of
European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the reports
published by the EU Electronic Communications Market indicators. Using this
information, Figure 1 looks at mobile traffic as a percentage of the total outgoing
traffic and reports the change in this percentage between 2005 and 2010 for almost all
the countries in our sample.15 The UK example is by no means an outlier: the average
increase of the mobile traffic percentage was 63% across all countries, indicating the
strong trend from fixed to mobile usage. In addition, we also collected similar
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Fig. 1. Mobile as a Percentage of Total Outgoing Traffic
Notes. The Figure presents information on the percentage of mobile traffic as a percentage of the
total outgoing traffic in the whole telecommunications industry (fixed-to-fixed, mobile-to-fixed,
fixed-to-mobile and M2M traffic).
Source. Authors’ calculations based on information from European Commission (Electronic
Communications Market Indicators – Digital Agenda Scoreboard), Body of European Regulators
for Electronic Communications (BEREC).
14 This is defined as (M2F + M2M)/(F2M + M2M + M2F + F2F) where each term is expressed in
minutes.
15 For Luxembourg and New Zealand, we could only find information for 2008 and 2009, so we do not
report them in the graph.
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information on the ratio of mobile (M2F + M2M) to total (F2M + M2M + M2F)
outgoing voice traffic16 on a quarterly basis from the market research company Analysys
Mason. We also looked at other measures (e.g. the percentage of mobile subscribers of
the whole telephony industry) and at other periods. They are not reported here for the
sake of brevity but they all show an unmistakable pattern: fixed telephony has been
declining over time in its importance compared to mobile telephony as far as voice and
text communications are concerned.17 As a consequence, the waterbed effect should
have been overtaken by competitive effects within the mobile industry.
Using these new data sets, we calculated the ratio of mobile to total traffic at the time
of the introduction of MTR regulation across all countries. We then split the sample
into those countries with above and below median mobile to total traffic ratio and
compare the evolution of prices in those countries using as a control the countries that
Table 5
The Effect of Mobile Traffic on Waterbed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method IV IV IV IV
Dependent variable ln Pujct ln Pujct ln Pujct ln Pujct
Time period 2002–11 2002–11 2002–11 2002–11
Mobile relative to total traffic Low High Low High
ln(MTR)jct 0.321*** 0.099 0.285** 0.031
(0.104) (0.183) (0.114) (0.159)
Pre-paidjct 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.098*** 0.065**
(0.024) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027)
Usage-country-operator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
MaxCountry
MTR indexjct
1st stage coefficient 0.119*** 0.134*** 0.124*** 0.125***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
1st stage R2 0.162 0.174 0.114 0.222
1st stage F-test 126.83 205.61 105.85 172.02
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007]
Observations 4,203 4,002 4,209 3,996
Clusters 159 153 165 147
Notes. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the PPP adjusted total bill paid by consumers with different
usage at every quarter. Columns (1) and (2) utilise information on mobile to total traffic from the Body of
European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), whereas the last two columns use similar
information from the market research company Analysys Mason (see, subsection 4.1 in the main text for
more details). The instrumental variable MaxCountryMTR is an index that takes larger values the more
regulated a mobile operator is compared to the MTR prior to regulation in that country. p-values for
diagnostic tests are in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the country-operator-usage level are reported in
parenthesis below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source. Authors’ calculations based on the Teligen data corresponding to the best deals available at every
quarter.
16 Hence, excluding F2F voice traffic from the total traffic. The new ratio is defined as (M2F + M2M)/
(F2M + M2M + M2F), where each term is expressed in minutes.
17 Fixed telephony, however, still performs other fundamental roles – in particular it provides the main
infrastructure for broadband communications.
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were always regulated. Table 5 reports the results. Using the BEREC/EU information,
we find a positive and significant waterbed effect in column (1) for those countries that
introduced the MTR regulation when they had a below median mobile to total traffic
ratio but no waterbed effect in column (2) for those countries that introduce the same
regulation when they had an above median similar ratio. Columns (3) and (4) repeat
the same exercise using the Analysys Mason information. Again, countries with below
median ratio seem to experience a positive and significant waterbed effect, which
disappears for those with a high mobile total traffic ratio. Notice that in all columns the
first stage effect of a cut in MTRs on prices is always negative and significant.
4.2. Impact on Profits
We finally looked at the impact of regulation of termination rates on mobile operators’
profits. Operators often challenge, and vehemently so, regulatory cuts in court. They
argue that regulatory cuts will reduce their profitability and, more importantly, will
diminish their incentives to invest in the industry, for example, via technology
improvements and upgrades. The operators’ behaviour is, however, mixed in this
respect, as these views are not shared by all, especially as some operators have argued
that, on the contrary, reduced termination rates will be pro-competitive since they will
reduce asymmetric treatments between on-net and off-net calls.
We do not find any statistically relevant result.18 MTR regulation did not seem to
affect profits either way over the entire period. We also tested if there was any
differential impact of regulation of termination rates on the profits of ‘large’ versus
‘small’ operators (we defined as ‘small’ any other than the two biggest operators in
each country). On the one hand, smaller operators typically have more outgoing than
incoming off-net traffic, so they might benefit from cuts that will reduce their net
outgoing payments. On the other hand, smaller operators have been allowed for some
time higher (asymmetric) termination rates, thus a cut in termination rates might be
tougher for them. Again, we find no differential impact of regulation of termination
rates on the profits of small and large operators. The effects are not significantly
different from zero.
On balance, we do not find evidence that profits of mobile operators have been
affected by regulatory cuts in termination rates. Data, however, are considerably
noisier than the price basket data and results should therefore be taken with caution.
It is in fact possible that regulation did have a negative effect on profits but our data
do not capture the fact that mobile operators have also been effective at reducing
their cost base at the same time. For instance, policies such as cell site sharing, or
exploiting economies of scope between voice and data (migration from 2G to 3G
services) occurred over the same period as MTR regulation became tighter. To the
extent that these cost reductions applied differentially between markets over time,
then our time dummies would not properly account for them. This issue requires
further investigation, which largely depends on having access to better data on the
operators’ accounts.
18 Results are reported in Table B2 (see online Appendix B).
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5. Conclusions
We have conducted an assessment of regulation of MTRs over the last decade (2002–
11), using a large sample of mobile operators which have been subject to various
degrees of regulation over time. Our new results qualify in an important way our earlier
findings (Genakos and Valletti, 2011) which were obtained using a similar approach,
but employing a data set valid only until 2006.
We have found that the waterbed effect has essentially unwound over time. While, in
the earlier periods, regulatory cuts in termination rates also produced an increase in
mobile customers’ bills, this does not hold on average using the more recent data. We
demonstrate that this is due to the diminishing importance of F2M calls relative to
M2M calls. This is in line both with theoretical predictions and with actual industry
trends.
The implications of our results are strong. Earlier regulation of termination rates had
to find the right balance between the benefits that would accrue to fixed users calling
mobile phones and the negative impact onmobile phone users. This was quite a difficult
exercise. We show that this trade-off only emerges if the F2M calls traffic is significantly
larger than the M2M traffic. Since the trend in all countries is towards an increase in
M2M traffic, the case for intervention is now more compelling as unintended
consequences of regulation, such as the waterbed effect, are less likely to arise.
Clearly, regulatory cuts cannot continue forever since rates are reaching the natural
limit of the incremental costs.19 Regulation in the EU is therefore close to an end, in
that it cannot get any tighter than it currently is, though it cannot be removed as
otherwise operators could respond by increasing termination rates again. However, the
regulatory battleground is still very much open elsewhere – in particular in African and
Latin American countries, where termination rates are typically much higher than in
the EU. As also in these countries, the mobile industry has surpassed fixed telephony in
terms of subscribers and call volumes, our results suggest that competitive effects
within the mobile industry should now prevail over the waterbed effect.
The impact of regulation has also to account for the impact it has on firms’ profits
and their incentives to invest. Possible short-run benefits from wholesale regulation
must always be confronted with their long-run consequences. We found scant evidence
that profits have been reduced by regulation. We also pointed out as a caveat that
available price data are typically richer than information about operators’ profits. It
would be very interesting to find more granular data at the firm level in order to
investigate if this type of regulation actually induced firms to take actions that affected
their network costs or the quality of their offerings.
Appendix A. A Model of Competition with F2M and M2M Calls
The purpose of this section is to present a model that generates the tension between F2M and
M2M calls, as described by (1) in the main text. Our aim is to show a possibility result under very
19 Currently, MTRs are approaching 1 €cent/min in the EU, down from an average of 13 €cents/min in
2005. Source: BEREC. A system of ‘bill-and-keep’, where calls are exchanged among all operators at a zero
marginal cost, is the lowest possible MTR that can be eventually applied.
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simple assumptions. To do so, we propose a model that builds directly on Armstrong and Wright
(2009) and Hurkens and Lopez (2014).
Imagine a setting with one fixed network and two competing mobile networks, denoted as
firms 1 and 2. There is a total mass of nF users on the fixed network. The two mobile firms
compete for a continuum of mobile consumers of mass nM. Each firm i = 1, 2 charges consumers
a fixed fee f i and can discriminate between calls made on-net (i.e. made to customers belonging
to the same network i) and off-net (i.e. made to customers belonging to the rival network j). Firm
i’s marginal on-net price is denoted as pii and the off-net price is denoted as pij. Mobile
consumers’ utility from making calls of length q is given by a concave, increasing and bounded
utility function u(q). Call demand q(p) is defined by u 0[q(p)] = p. The indirect utility derived
from making calls at price p is v(p) = u[q(p)]  pq(p), where v 0(p) = q(p).
Eachmobile firm is assumed to incur amarginal cost co of originating a call and amarginal cost cT
of terminating a call, so the actualmarginal cost of aM2Mcall is givenby co + cT. In addition, there is
a fixed cost f of serving each mobile subscriber, which includes, for example, the subscriber’s
handset and the billing costs. If calls are made off-net, the sending firm does not incur the
termination cost cT, but pays its rival a termination charge, denoted by a. Instead, termination costs
cT are borne by the receiving firm, which gets a from the sending firm.
As for F2M calls, there are also the same costs co for origination and cT for termination of calls.
The fixed network, again, has to pay the termination charge a instead of the termination costs,
which are borne by the receiving network. We assume that there are q(P) minutes of F2M calls to
each subscriber on network i (mobile customers only receive calls from the fixed network),
where P denotes the F2M per-minute price. We also assume that P is given by P = co + a. As
discussed by Armstrong and Wright (2009), such pricing could arise as a result of the regulation
of the fixed network or competition between fixed networks.20 If xi denotes mobile firm i’s
market share, its total profits are given by
pi ¼nMxif½fi  f þ xiðpii  co  cT ÞqðpiiÞ þ ð1 xiÞðpij  co  aÞqðpijÞ þ ð1 xiÞ
ða  cT ÞqðpjiÞ þ ða  cT ÞnFqðco þ aÞg:
(A.1)
The expression is made of several terms in the curly bracket. The first terms, grouped in the
square bracket, correspond to profits from own customers who subscribe and make both a
fraction xi of on-net M2M calls and a fraction 1  xi of off-net M2M calls. The other two terms
correspond to profits from termination respectively from M2M off-net calls and from F2M
calls.
To close the model, we follow Hurkens and Lopez (2014) and assume that mobile networks
are differentiated a la Hotelling. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the segment [0, 1],
while the two networks are located at the two ends of this segment (x1 = 0 and x2 = 1). We
assume full participation so that each consumer subscribes to the network that yields the highest
net utility. A consumer located at x and joining network i obtains a net utility given by
wi  tjx  xi j;
where t is the customary ‘transportation cost’ which measures the degree of horizontal
differentiation between the two networks, and wi is the value to a consumer subscribing to
network i. In particular, given that consumers call each other with the same probability, the
surplus from subscribing to network i (gross of transportation costs) equals
wi ¼ nM½xei vðpiiÞ þ xej vðpijÞ  fi ;
20 Note that, when P = co + a, a regulation that cuts the termination rate a obviously confers benefits to
those calling mobile phones from the fixed network. We are instead interested here to see the impact of this
regulation on mobile customers.
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where xei is the expected market share of firm i. Market share of network i is thus given by
xi ¼ 1
2
þ wi  wj
2t
; (A.2)
We solve for the equilibrium where firm i (and similarly, j) maximise its profits (A.1) with respect
to the multi-part tariff {pii, pij, f i}, subject to (A.2), and where consumers’ expectations are self-
fulfilled at equilibrium, that is, xei ¼ xi
The symmetric equilibrium is actually quite simple to characterise (for further details about
existence, see Hurkens and Lopez, 2014). Because of the multi-part nature of the tariff, call
prices are set at the ‘perceived’ marginal costs, i.e. pii = co + cT and pij = co + a. The fixed fee is
equal to f i = f + t  (a  cT)q(a + cT)q(a + cTnF). The total bill of a mobile consumer is then
Bill ¼ fi þ nM ½xipiiqðpiiÞ þ ð1 xiÞpij qðpijÞ
¼ f þ t  ða  cT Þqða þ cT ÞnF þ nM ½ðco þ cTÞqðco þ cT Þ þ ðco þ aÞqðco þ aÞ
2
:
(A.3)
This expression shares the features of (1) in the main text. The bill reflects fixed costs to supply
the service ( f ) and the intensity of competition as described by the transportation cost (t). There
are then two terms which directly depend on the termination charge a. One term represents the
waterbed effect coming from F2M calls: if termination regulation cuts a and thus reduces the
rents from F2M calls, the bill will go up. This effect is bigger the larger the fixed network, as
captured by nF. Finally, the last term produces an opposite effect: the lower a, the cheaper will be
off-net M2M calls, thus reducing the customer’s bill. This effect prevails as the mobile network
gets larger, as captured by nM.
Let us define F(a)  (a  cT)q(a + cT) and M ðaÞ  ½ðco þ cT Þqðco þ cT Þ þðco þ aÞqðco þ aÞ=2.
It is for sure F 0(a) > 0 and M 0(a) > 0, as long as a is set close to cost. Then (A.3) becomes
Bill ¼ f þ t  F ðaÞnF þM ðaÞnM ; (A.4)
which forms the basis for our empirical specification. The total impact of regulation on the bill is
@Bill
@a
¼ F 0ðaÞnF þM 0ðaÞnM : (A.5)
The sign varies as follows: @Bill=@a ¼ 0 $ nF =nM\M 0=F 0: The overall waterbed effect in this
model thus depends on the ratio nF/nM. If this ratio is large, the waterbed effect is predicted and
bills will go up as a consequence of a regulation which cuts termination charges. If this ratio is
small, the waterbed effect will vanish and can even change sign.
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